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the "laboratory" of the states. Id. at 2859 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Justice Scalia also concurred with the 
Court's analysis but preferred that the 
decision pronounce that the federal 
courts have no business in this field. Id. 
(Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that 
American Law has always accorded the 
state power to prevent suicide. He added 
that the cause of death in suicide and 
starvation is the suicidal person's con-
scious decision to "pu[t] an end to his 
own existence." Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries 189). 
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall 
and Justice Blackmun, opined that the 
majority's opinion failed to respect the 
best interests of the patients. He stated 
that "the right to be free from unwanted 
medical treatment [was] categorically 
limited to those patients who had the 
foresight to make an unambiguous state-
ment of their wishes while competent." 
Id. at 2879 (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens, dissenting, questioned 
the majority's definition of "life" by sug-
gesting that, for patients like Nancy, 
there is a serious question as to whether 
the mere persistence of their bodies is 
"life." Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). He emphasized that "[t]he mean-
ing and completion of her life should be 
controlled by persons who have her best 
interests at heart - not by a state legisla-
ture concerned only with the 'preserva-
tion oflife.'" Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
The Supreme Court recognized that a 
"right to die" exists by virtue of the Due 
Process Clause and mandated that it be 
respected in states that have such legis-
lation. Missouri properly chose to limit 
this right by requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's wishes. 
Other limits on the right to die are left to 
the states to define in their own "labora-
tories." It would appear that the confu-
sion over the right to die has just begun. 
- Lesley A. Davis 
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Peel v. Illinois: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT'S COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH STANDARDS ALLOW 
AN ATTORNEY TO ADVERTISE 
HIS CERTIFICATION 
In Peel v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281 
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court 
held that an attorney had a constitution-
ally protected right, under the first 
amendment's commercial speech stan-
dards, to advertise his certification as a 
trial specialist. States are, thereby, pro-
hibited from completely banning these 
advertisements but may use less restric-
tive measures to regulate them. 
In 1987, the Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois 
("Commission") rued a complaint alleg-
ing that Gary Peel held himself out as a 
certified legal specialist in violation of 
the Illinois Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2285. 
Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code 
of Professional Responsibility provides 
that" a lawyer or law firm may specify or 
designate any area or field of law in 
which he or its partners concentrates or 
limits his or its practice ... no lawyer may 
hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'spe-
cialist.''' Id. at 2286. Peel's professional 
letterhead included the notation "Certi-
fied Civil Trial Specialist by the National 
Board of Trial Advocacy" ("NBTA"), fol-
lowed by the words "Licensed: Illinois, 
Missouri, Arizona." Id. at 2285. 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that 
the letterhead was misleading in three 
ways. First, on the letterhead, the certi-
fication was listed prior to the licensure, 
and the court found that the public 
could mistakenly construe that Peel's 
authority to practice trial advocacy came 
from the NBTA, thereby" impinging on 
the exclusive authority" of the courts to 
license attorneys. Id. at 2286. Second, 
the NBTA certification implied that 
Peel's legal services as a trial advocate 
were superior to other attorneys' serv-
ices, and thirdly, that NBT A certification 
was a product of state licensure. Id. at 
2287. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme 
Court followed the Commission's recom-
mendation and censured Peel. Id at 
2286. 
The Supreme Court found that NBTA 
was a well recognized organization re-
quiring exacting standards for certifica-
tion. These standards included jury and 
non-jury trial experience as lead coun-
sel, successful completion of a day-long 
examination, continuing legal education 
requirements, and demonstrated writ-
ingability.Id. at 2284-85. The Court also 
found that certification must be renewed 
every five years and that several states, 
including Minnesota and Alabama, rec-
ognized NBTA certification. Id 
The Court next examined which stan-
dards should be used in determining 
whether the State could regulate this 
type of advertisement. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the state court that 
the standards for commercial speech 
under the first amendment applied be-
cause Peel's letterhead was a "form of 
commercial speech governed by the 
'constitutional limitations on the regula-
tion oflawyer advertising.'" Id. at 2287 
(quoting In re Peel, 126 Ill.2d 397, 402, 
534 N.E.2d 980, 982). 
In the case ofInreR.M], 455 U.S. 191 
(1982), the Court summarized these 
standards as: 
Truthful advertising related to law-
ful activities is entitled to the pro-
tections of the First Amendment. 
But when the particular content 
or method of advertising suggests 
that it is inherently misleading or 
when experience has proved that 
in fact such advertising is subject 
to abuse, the States may impose 
appropriate restrictions. 
Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2287. However, the 
Court in In re R.M] also held that the 
states may not place an absolute prohi-
bition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information. Id. (citing In re 
R.M], 455 U.S. at 203.) 
The Court then evaluated whether 
the letterhead was misleading and 
whether state censorship was justified. 
The Court assumed that some con-
sumers might infer from the sequential 
listing of the certification that it ex-
ceeded the qualifications for admission 
to a state bar. Id. at 2288. However, 
since the NBTA's requirements were 
verifiable factually, and not statements 
of quality or opinion, they were not mis-
leading. Id. In addition, the Court 
emphasized that NBTA's certification 
was like a trademark, in that, the quality 
of the certification was recognized be-
cause of the organization granting it. Id. 
The state court had argued that the 
statements were misleading because con-
sumers might identify the certification 
as being issued by the state. The Supreme 
Court disagreed, and stated that "we are 
satisfied that the consuming public 
understands that licenses ... are issued 
by governmental authorities and that a 
host of certificates ... are issued by pri-
vate organizations." ld. at 228Q. 
In balancing the State's interest in 
avoiding misleading consumers with the 
cost of completely banning advertise-
ments of certification, the Court found 
that less burdensome alternatives 
existed The State could create initial 
screening criteria for certifying organiza-
tions or require disclaimers on attorney 
advertisements about the organizations 
or their standards. ld. at 2292-93. 
It is interesting to note that Rule 2-
1 05( a)( 3) allows for attorneys to ad-
vertise specialties in patent or trademark 
law. The Court stated that a complete 
ban on advertising certifications by the 
state would be undermined by allowing 
such exceptions. ld. at 2291. 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist andJustice Scalia, argued that 
the State had a legitimate interest in 
regulating abuse in attorney advertising 
and that the public could be readily 
misled by the juxtaposition on the let-
terhead of petitioner's licensing and his 
NBTA certification. Therefore, consu-
mers could mistakenly conclude that 
Peel's services were of higher quality 
because of his certification and that the 
State had approved the certification. ld. 
at 2300 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). As 
such a misleading advertisement, the 
State had the authority to prevent Peel 
from advertising his certification. ld. at 
2301 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
In Peel v. Illinois, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld an attorney's 
right to advertise his certification under 
the first amendment commercial 
speech standards. States may regulate 
advertising certifications but may not 
ban their use altogether. Future adver-
tising by attorneys of their certifications 
might, therefore, be required to meet 
minimum state screening requirements 
or be forced to include restricting lan-
guage such as disclaimers. 
-JoanOcboa 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz: VIDEO-
TAPED EVIDENCE CAN BE 
ADMITTED AT THE CRIMINAL 
TRIALS OF DRUNK DRIVERS 
In the drunk driving case of Pennsyl-
vania v. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. 2638 ( 1990), 
the United States Supreme Court held 
that evidence obtained by way of video-
tape was admissible because the ques-
tions fell within the "routine booking" 
exception to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). The Court also refused 
to suppress parts of the videotaped evi-
dence concerning statements made dur-
ing processing, since they were volun-
tary and not made during custodial 
interrogation. 
Inocencio Muniz was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol 
and transported to a booking center 
after failing three standard field sobriety 
tests. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2642. In line 
with police procedure, the proceedings 
at the booking center were videotaped. 
The attending officer first asked Muniz 
the standard questions, including his 
name, address, height, weight, eye color, 
date of birth, and current age, to which 
Muniz stumbled over several responses. 
The officer then asked Muniz ifhe knew 
the date of his sixth birthday which 
Muniz was unable to provide. Finally, 
Muniz performed the three sobriety 
tests that he failed earlier and was 
requested to submit to a breathalyzer 
test, at which time he made several 
incriminating statements. ld. When 
Muniz refused to take the breath test, he 
was advised of his Miranda rights for the 
first time. The videotape of the proceed-
ings was admitted into evidence at his 
bench trial. Muniz was subsequently 
convicted of driving under the influence 
of alcohol. The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania reversed his conviction, holding 
that once Muniz was arrested and taken 
into custody, all utterances and re-
sponses were clearly compelled by the 
questions presented him during the 
booking proceedings. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that his responses and 
communications were elicited before 
he received his Miranda warnings and 
should have been suppressed. ld. at 
2643. 
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether various incrimi-
nating utterances of a drunk driving sus-
pect, made while performing a series of 
sobriety tests, constitute testimonial re-
sponses to custodial interrogation for 
purposes of the self-incrimination clause 
of the fifth amendment. ld. Eight justices 
agreed that most of the statements ad-
mitted into evidence did not violate the 
accused's fifth amendment rights, al-
though three reached this conclusion 
under a different analysis. 
The majority opinion began with a 
discussion of the types of evidence a 
suspect could not be compelled to pro-
duce. The Court noted that Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held 
that the self-incrimination clause did 
not protect a suspect from being com-
pelled to produce "real or physical evi-
dence." Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2643. Yet 
the clause did protect an accused from 
being compelled to provide evidence of 
a testimonial or communicative nature. 
Id. 
Furthermore, since the utterances 
were made prior to Muniz's receiving 
his Miranda warnings, the Court also 
focused on the "informal compulsion 
exerted by the law enforcement officers 
during in-custody questioning." ld. at 
2644 ( quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
u.s. 436,461 (1966». Thus, the Court 
concluded that the case implicated both 
the "testimonial" and "compulsion" com-
ponents of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the context of pretrial 
questioning. ld. 
Next, the Court addressed Muniz's re-
sponses to the initial questions regard-
ing name, address, weight, eye color, 
date ()fbirth, and current age. Although 
MLJniz's responses were incriminating, 
to violate th~ self-incrimination clause, 
they must have been either testimonial 
or elicited by custodial interrogation. ld. 
"In order to be testimonial, an accused's 
communication must itself, explicitly or 
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or 
disclose information." ld. at 2646 ( quot-
ing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 
210 ( 1988) ). In comparison, the Court 
cited numerous types of evidence held 
not to be testimonial including finger-
printing, photographing, appearing in 
court, standing, walking, writing, speak-
ing, and being forced to provide a blood 
sample. Finally, the Court concluded 
that testimonial evidence encompasses 
all responses that, if asked of a sworn 
suspect during a criminal trial, would 
place the suspect in the cruel trilemma 
of self accusation, perjury, or contempt. 
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